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Timorese demand to be heard 
The World Bank held its third donors' 
meeting on East Timor on 5 and 6 
December 2000. The meeting, in Brussels, 
reviewed progress one year after the first 
pledge of US$522 million for economic 
and social reconstruction, humanitarian 
programmes, and capacity-building in 
governance and administration. 
Throughout the year East Timorese have 
felt marginalised in much of the 
reconstruction effort by the United 
Nations and international agencies. 
I n Brussels, lobbyists representing East Timorese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women's organisations, 
international NGOs, and the Christian 
churches raised a wide range of concerns. 
The East Timorese Catholic and 
Protestant churches, echoed strongly by 
other sectors of East Timorese civil society, 
have called for justice. In a statement, 
Christian churches internationally backed 
the East Timorese demand for an 
international tribunal (see supplement to this 
issue of Timor Link) to try all suspected 
perpetrators of human rights violations and 
war crimes, whether Indonesian or East 
Timorese, regardless of military rank. The 
churches are also calling for the immediate 
and safe return of the refugees in West 
Tim or. 
East Timorese NGOs also made a clear 
call for justice to the UN Security Council 
mission which visited East Timor from 1 3 to 
15 November. In Brussels, they called for: 
• more information to be disseminated on 
laws and UN agencies; 
• a long-term approach to capacity 
building, with easier access to funds for 
this for local NGOs; 
• easier access to, and improved provision 
for, education, especially for girls; 
• more resources to be allocated to rural 
areas and to support the acquisition of 
land titles by farmers; 
Women in Los Palos wait for aid that has just arrived from Dili, September 1999. Nowt e emergency 
is over, development efforts must focus on increasing women's participation in decision-making. 
• family planning services and HIV/AIDS 
awareness programmes; 
• programmes which increase women's 
participation in decision-making. 
International NGOs are calling for a 
comprehensive strategy for reconstruction 
and development which: 
• is developed by a broad spectrum of 
Timorese society; 
• reflects the vital role of women and 
young people; 
• prioritises agriculture and rural 
development. 
The international NGOs are also calling for 
a proper exit strategy for the UN 
transitional authority, UNTAET. 
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East Timor at a glance 
EAST TIMOR: Nation in waiting 
East Timor emerged into the 21st 
century having endured 400 years of 
colonial rule, followed by nearly 
quarter of a century of brutally 
repressive occupation, and finally a 
brief but devastating period of 
violence. Having chosen 
independence, the people of this 
tiny country face the multiple tasks 
that building a political, social and 
commercial infrastructure out of the 
ashes of conflict implies. 
l:mor, which lies 482 km north of Darwin, Australia, was settled by Malay, Melanesian and Polynesian 
peoples before the arrival of Dutch and 
Portuguese settlers in the 16th century. 
The eastern part of the island began 
what was to be a long and traumatic 
struggle for independence in 1974, 
when Portugal began a process of 
decolonisation. 
On 11 August 1975 the Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT) staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesia's threat to 
intervene should the nationalist 
liberation movement, Fretilin, come to 
power after Portugal's withdrawal. The 
ensuing civil war cost the lives of 1,500 
people and saw Fretilin take control of 
most of Portuguese Timor. 
Invasion 
Worried by the proximity of an indepen-
dent state with radical policies, in 
December 1975 Indonesia launched a 
full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a 
fraudulent 'act of self-determination' (the 
'Balibo Declaration'), in May 1976 East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's 
27th Province. The United Nations 
always regarded the annexation 
as illegal. 
There followed years of determined 
resistance by the poorly armed Falintil on 
behalf of the East Timorese. It is 
estimated that some 200,000 people -
a third of the population at the time of 
the invasion - died from malnutrition, 
preventable diseases, or at the hands of 
the occupying forces. 
Under the Indonesian dictator 
Suharto, negotiations between the 
Indonesian government and Portugal -
in international law the administering 
power - became deadlocked. It was not 
until 1997-98, with financial crisis 
sweeping Asia and the final ebbing of 
international support for Suharto's 
corrupt regime, that there were real 
signs of change. 
Suharto's successor jusuf Habibie 
bowed to international pressure and, in 
essence, traded East Timor for much-
needed support from the International 
Monetary Fund. Habibie offered the East 
Timorese autonomy within Indonesia. If 
they rejected it, Indonesia would 'let East 
Timar go'. The offer was a pragmatic 
one, made by a stand-in president, and 
without wide consultation. Much of the 
Indonesian military was appalled. 
In negotiating the terms under which 
a ballot on the autonomy package would 
take place, the United Nations allowed 
Indonesia to provide the security. This 
was to prove costly, as it left the way 
open for those in the military special 
forces, Kopassus, responsible for the 
original invasion, to try to influence the 
result or wreak revenge should they fail . 
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Braving violent intimidation by 
Indonesian militia, more than 90 per 
cent of eligible East Timorese voters 
turned out, and nearly 80 per cent of 
them voted for independence. The 
United Nations had assured voters it 
would stay after the ballot. Although a 
backlash had been predicted, the 
severity of the violence that followed the 
announcement of the results took the 
world by surprise. As UN personnel fled, 
the Indonesian military and militias drove 
nearly 300,000 people over the border 
into West Timor, while killing, raping and 
looting, and laying waste to East Timor's 
long-neglected infrastructure. 
Transition 
Following an intervention by an armed 
international force (INTERFET) in 
September 1999, and with the departure 
of all Indonesian troops on 31 October, 
East Timor came under the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET) headed by Sergio 
de Mello. It was expected to take 
UNTAET two to three years to prepare 
the territory for full independence. The 
first six months of freedom were spent 
responding to a major emergency -
feeding the hungry and trying to 
facilitate the return of the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced. By December 
2000 there were still 100,000 East 
Timorese in refugee camps ig West Timor 
alone. Some were displaced further afield. 
Militias were running many of the camps 
and preventing people from returning to 
East Timor. 
UNTAET inherited a country with a 
largely unemployed population and an 
economy in ruins. Key chall~nges include 
the search for reconciliation with justice, 
and supporting the growth of a strong 
civil society in East Timor. But the East 
Timorese are now free at last to begin 
constructing an indeper;ident nation. 
In the late 1990s, the political scene 
in East Timor came to be dominated by 
the National Council for East Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT), a grouping of old 
anti-Indonesian parties. The CNRT is led 
by Xanana Gusmao, the 'Asian Mandela', 
who spent most of the 1990s in jail in 
Indonesia for his part in the armed 
resistance. His popularity among the East 
Timorese, and the resilience of the 
people, will be major factors shaping the 
recovery that needs to take place at every 
level of society. 
In search of justice: 
An international tribunal for East Timor 
Human rights and accountability 
Accountability is a key principle in human rights work. Fighting impunity is a 
way to implement the human rights conventions and declarations that the 
United Nations has assembled over the years. 
Prosecution offers a means to prevent further human rights abuse. In contrast 
to economic sanctions, which also hurt innocent people, international 
prosecution targets individual perpetrators, and therefore addresses the problem 
more precisely. 
International prosecution is a relatively new instrument in tackling human 
rights crimes. In the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials at the end of the Second World 
War, individuals were prosecuted for crimes against humanity. These tribunals, 
however, were established by the victorious powers. In 1947 the UN secretariat 
had drafted a statute for a permanent international criminal court, to be 
attached to the Genocide Convention. The convention, however, was passed 
without the statute. In the 1990s ad hoc tribunals were set up to deal with war 
crimes committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1992 the UN General Assembly 
asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a statute for a 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). In July 1998 a conference of 
states convened in Rome to adopt the statute of the ICC (known as the 'Rome 
Statute'). The statute must be ratified by 60 states for the ICC to go into 
operation. By October 2000 only 22 states had ratified it. Therefore the 
international court is not yet in operation. 
Justice, conflict resolution, reconciliation and peace 
Some people claim that justice is a form of revenge and therefore undermines 
peace and reconciliation efforts. In East Timor, advocates of integration with 
Indonesia tend to confuse the notion of reconciliation with that of conflict 
resolution, or even with cease-fire negotiations (with the pro-Indonesian 
militias). The term 'reconciliation' implies a bilateral process between different 
societies or social groups (for example, between 'the Germans' and 'the Jews' 
after the Holocaust). As elsewhere, it will take generations to achieve true 
reconciliation in East Timor. 
Justice is an integral part of this long and painful reconciliation process. 
Administration of justice is an instrument of conflict resolution that precedes 
reconciliation. Reconciliation can only proceed once abuses have ceased 
completely and security has been established. 
Many East Timorese 
organisations, including the 
churches, the National 
Council for Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT) and non-
governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have called for an 
international criminal tribunal 
to prosecute those 
responsible for gross 
violations of human rights 
and breaches of international 
humanitarian law in East 
Timor. On 31 January 2000 a 
UN commission of inquiry 
recommended that an 
international court be 
established for this purpose. 
Journalist Sabine Hammer 
examines the potential of 
international prosecution. 
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UNTAET [the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor]'s mandate stresses the 
importance of reconciliation. The East Timorese people also seek reconciliation 
between all sections of their society - but bringing the key perpetrators of war 
crimes to justice is an essential element of reconciliation. UNTAET is failing to 
carry out its mandate to 'bring to justice' those responsible for war crimes if it 
does not provide sufficient resources to the investigation of war crimes. These 
war crimes took place over a year ago and the longer the investigations are 
delayed the less likely it is that there will ever be successful prosecutions. 
The NGO Forum calls on the Security Council to require UNTAET to 
immediately reallocate substantial resources to the investigation of war crimes. 
Until the NGO Forum sees war crimes being appropriately investigated it does 
not accept that UNTAET is fulfilling its mandate to bring those responsible for 
war crimes to justice. Without bringing those responsible for war crimes to 
justice there cannot be reconciliation among the East Timorese people. If there 
is no transparent and workable system of justice established in East Timor, 
there will be no incentive to return for those militia leaders in West Timor 
seeking the protection of justice. 
Statement to the UN Security Council Mission to East Timor by the East 
Timor NGO Forum (FONGTIL), 13 November 2000. 
Human rights abuses are continuing and even basic security is not fully 
established in East Timor, let alone West Timor. Victims can only begin to think 
about reconciliation if they no longer feel threatened 
Delivering justice by ascertaining guilt or innocence in a court of law can help 
to mark the transition from the phase of conflict resolution to that of peacemaking 
and reconciliation. Establishing accountability is therefore crucial to conflict 
resolution, particularly in a severe and complex case such as that of East Timor. 
Principles of international criminal prosecution 
International criminal prosecution of serious crimes 
1. establishes individual guilt. The concept of collective culpability will only 
trigger the next conflict. Guilt must be individualised. 
2. aims to prevent future crimes on both 
(a) an individual basis: imprisonment removes persistent offenders from 
potential victims. For example, Indonesians suspected of serious 
humanitarian crimes in East Timor are believed to be perpetrating similar 
crimes in various parts of Indonesia, including West Timor; the 
perpetrators also continue to threaten security in East Timor; 
(b) a structural basis: impunity encourages crime and violence. For example, 
the Indonesian armed forces (the TNI) are believed to instigate violent 
conflicts to advance their claim to political power. The security situation 
in East (and West) Timor will remain volatile as long as TNI continues to 
foster conflicts for political gain. 
3. helps to establish rule of law. Impunity, or the lack of impartial prosecution, 
may provoke people to take justice into their own hands. It may also 
encourage petty crime: why should it be a crime to steal, if mass murder goes 
unpunished? 
4. Arrests help the victims to feel safe again. Victims of severe abuse, such as 
rape, tend to blame themselves for the assaults. Public judgement of the 
offender can help to reduce the psychological burden and help the victims to 
regain their self-esteem.1 Society may start to acknowledge that the victim 
was indeed victimised. The dignity of the victim comes first. Research on the 
Holocaust has shown that such traumas do not remain confined to the actual 
victim but can be passed down through generations. 
Truth commissions and compensation 
National truth commissions can supplement but not replace the judicial 
determination of guilt or innocence. It is only through judicial proceedings that 
sentences can be passed and compensation addressed. 
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' Anecdotal evidence from Burma, Thailand 
and Cambodia strongly suggests that rape 
victims are at risk of further abuse, by being 
forced into prostitution. 
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Compensation is also an instrument for reconciliation. Rather than abstractly 
punishing the offender Jewish law, for example, as reflected in the Bible, 
required a thief to pay reparations to the victim. Reparations had to exceed the 
damage caused by three or four times, making the victim into a winner and thus 
fostering the will for forgiveness and reconciliation. The concept of 
compensating victims of crime and their families as a means to resolve conflict 
and encourage reconciliation is also popular today in South East Asia and the 
Pacific.2 Such models could be incorporated into a tribunal on East Timor. The 
UN Commission of Inquiry on East Timor stressed in its report that 
compensation is of paramount importance. 
Types of crime eligible for international prosecution 
Genocide 
The Genocide Convention provides for prosecution and punishment of acts of 
genocide, conspiracy, incitement and attempt to commit genocide, and even 
complicity in genocide. Public officials and government representatives may be 
indicted. But offenders need not be employees or agents of the state: private 
individuals may also be prosecuted. In the case of East Timor, this would mean 
that militia leaders could be indicted without the need to prove chain-of-
command connections with state or military authorities.3 
Genocide is defined as an attempt to destroy in whole or part a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group by any of the following acts: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 4 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 5 
There is no statement about a minimum number of killings which might 
constitute genocide. Judges in the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) considered that deeds could be referred to as genocide when an offender 
killed or harmed6 a considerable number of members of the group in a 
community or region. 
East Timor solidarity groups are not discussing genocide as grounds for an 
international tribunal, although it could be proved for 1999, and also from 
1975-99 (the period of Indonesian occupation). However, an Indonesian inquiry 
commission concluded in February 2000 that it had no evidence of genocide. It 
has therefore been clear for months now that any Indonesian prosecution will 
not deal with the issue. The international community must establish an 
international court to ensure accountability for genocide. Highlighting the fact of 
genocide could strengthen the case for an international tribunal. 
Crimes against humanity 
These are punishable under Article 6(c) of the statute of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal and Article S(c) of the Tokyo Charter. The basis 
for establishing such crimes has been considerably expanded in the tribunals on 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The ICC statute spells them out: murder, extinction, 
elements of torture (even if the offender is not related to state or military 
institutions), certain forms of imprisonment, rape, sexual slavery (including 
forced prostitution, forced pregnancies) or any severe form of sexual violence, 
deportation or violent transfer of population, persecution of identifiable groups 
for political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender-specific 
reasons, forced disappearances7, apartheid or similar acts 'intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health' . 
To qualify as crimes against humanity, these acts must have been widespread 
and systematic, and directed against the civilian population. Crimes against 
humanity can be perpetrated by governments or individuals. For East Timor, as 
in the case of genocide, there is no need to prove a link between the TNI and the 
militias.8 
2 It was also recently revived in German 
criminal law. In certain conditions, offender-
victim-accommodatiion 'Tater-Opfer-
Ausgleich' can offer incentives for 
reconciliation and may help to reduce prison 
terms. 
' It has been claimed that the relationship 
between the militia and TNI must be proved 
before an international tribunal can be 
established. This is a myth. 
4 This is the only part of the definition that is 
not relevant in the case of East Timor. 
' Abductions of East Timorese children to 
Indonesia were frequent. 
' As defined above in points (b)-(e). 
7 Includes kidnapping 'with the authorisation, 
support or acquiescence of, a State or a 
political organisation, followed by a refusal 
to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom 
or to give information on the fate or 
whereabouts of those persons, with the 
intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period 
of time.' This may apply to a considerable 
number of the East Timorese ' refugees'. 
Advocacy should give special attention to 
personal and territorial jurisdiction (see 
below) because only crimes committed in 
East Timor, and not in West Timor, were 
considered by the UN inquiry commission. 
• This was an issue in the military tribunals at 
the end of the Second World War, but 
arguments about governmental involvement 
in such crimes is no longer relevant today. 
Neither the ILC draft Code of Crimes against 
Peace and Security of Mankind nor the ICTY 
(see proceedings against Tadic, IT-94-1 ) 
demands involvement of the state. But, 
again in contrast w ith the Nuremberg 
tribunal, the ICC and the statute of the 
Rwanda Tribunal state that the crime must 
be part of a widespread or systematic attack. 
There is no need to establish the existence of 
an armed conflict. 
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War crimes 
Human Rights Watch has argued that one could not talk about war crimes in 
East Timor because there was no war.9 This is open to interpretation. Nobel Peace 
Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta has repeatedly called for an international 'war crimes 
tribunal' to be established. Recently the Rome statute stressed the importance of 
prosecuting war crimes 'when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of 
a large-scale commission of such crimes'. 
International humanitarian law distinguishes international armed conflicts 
from internal ones. 
War crimes in international conflicts 
These include: 
1. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their protocols of 
1977: 
• wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of protected persons;10 
• wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
• the destruction of property if not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
• hostage-taking; 
• unlawful deportation; 
• making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; 
• launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated; 
• making non-defended localities and demilitarised zones the object of 
attack; 
• the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies. 11 
2. Other serious violations of international humanitarian law: 
• attacking undefended targets such as homes and buildings, by whatever 
means; 
• using a civilian or protected person to make certain locations immune 
from military operations;12 
• making improper use of the flag of, among others, the United Nations 
(and causing death or injury thereby);13 
• intentional attacks against buildings dedicated to religion; 14 
• destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; 
• pillaging; 
• committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment. 
3. Other severe violations of the laws and customs of war. 
4. Attacks on personnel, infrastructure, material and vehicles used for 
humanitarian missions or peace-keeping operations under the UN charter15 
are now considered to be war crimes. 
5. Also newly defined as a war crime is severe collateral damage to the 
environment. 
6. Sexual violence is now defined as a separate category of war crime.16 
War crimes in non-international conflicts 
Indonesia might argue that the conflict in East Timor was not international, and 
that the events of 1999 were 'internal disturbances' rather than a military 
conflict. The following crimes in East Timor would still constitute war crimes: 
1. sexual violence; 
2. attacks on personnel and infrastructure for humanitarian missions or peace-
keeping operations. 
The International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) offers a model for 
prosecution of war crimes in an internal conflict. It has the power to prosecute, 
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9 Referring to the period from 30 August to 30 
September 1999. 
10 Sick or wounded combatants, prisoners of 
war and civilians. 
11 This provision from Additional Protocol I 
could apply to Indonesia's policy of 
transmigrasi, in the case of East Timor. 
12 This could apply to the evacuation by 
Brimob (the Indonesian riot police) of 
international observers from the International 
Federation for East Timor on 5 September 
1999. 
13 In the East Timor case, this may apply to 
crimes committed from stolen UN vehicles 
marked with the UN insignia. 
14 Examples of this in East Timor would be the 
attack on Bishop Belo's house, and on 
churches and church compounds in Suai and 
Liqui~a, and the massacre at Santa Cruz 
Cemetery in Dili in 1991. 
15 This might apply to the attacks on 
humanitarian aid suppliers in Liqui~a and 
Atambua. 
16 The IClY subsumed this as violation of the 
Geneva Conventions; in the cases of Gagovic 
et a/ii (IT-96-23) and Delalic et a/ii (IT-96-21 ). 
The indictment regarded rape as a form of 
torture, and Indonesia has ratified the UN 
convention against torture. Crimes of sexual 
violence committed in East Timor must be 
dealt with. There is an urgent need to boost 
the dignity of women and to promote 
healing. 
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not only for genocide and crimes against humanity, but also for serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, and of Additional 
Protocol II. The ICTR statute describes these serious violations as including, but 
not limited to: 
• violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any 
form of corporal punishment; 
• collective punishments; 
• taking of hostages; 
• acts of terrorism; 
• outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
• pillage; 
• the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised 
peoples; 
• threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
Temporal jurisdiction: Crimes since 1975 or 1999? 
The UN Commission of Inquiry into East Timor was mandated to look into 
crimes committed only after January 1999.17 Consequently it could only 
recommend the establishment of a court to try crimes after that date. The 
limited time frame reduces the scope for compensation18 and keeps Suharto out 
of range. In practical terms, it is more likely that an international ad hoc court 
would deal with crimes since 1999. However, a lobbying strategy of calling for a 
complete investigation from 1975 would not go amiss: it could lead to a 
compromise on the January 1999 starting point. 19 
Territorial and personal jurisdiction: Crimes against East 
Timorese outside East Timor? 
The UN inquiry commission investigated 'possible violations of human rights 
and acts which may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law 
committed in East Timor', that is, all human rights-related crimes committed in 
the territory. The commission, therefore, could give no recommendation on 
crimes committed in West Timor, at sea or on Indonesian territory - for 
example, several well-documented cases of sexual crimes in West Timor, as well 
as the murder, in September 2000, in the town of Atambua in West Timor, of 
three foreign staff of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
The UN commission confined the jurisdiction of its recommended tribunal 
to 'serious violations of fundamental human rights and international 
humanitarian law which took place in East Timor [ ... ] regardless of the 
nationality of the individual or where that person was when the violations were 
committed'. The last words were an attempt to ensure that suspects who 
remained outside East Timor, for example certain generals, would qualify as 
suspects. 20 
With regard to the events of 1999, and those at the end of the year in 
particular, as well as throughout 2000, lobbyists should consider expanding the 
territorial limits of the court to, for example, 'crimes committed against East 
Timorese in East Timor or in Indonesia or at sea'.21 
Responsibility for prosecution 
Indonesia 
Indonesia claims the right to deal at a national level with serious human rights 
violations committed in East Timor. However, it has a duty to try crimes of 
genocide and crimes under international humanitarian law, and has also ratified 
the UN convention against torture, so it must try crimes under this. 
17 Resolution 1999/S-4/1. 
18 There were 24 years of destruction. 
1
• For comparison: 
ICTY: crimes from 1 January 1991. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR): crimes from 1 January to 31 
December 1994. 
ICC: crimes after the statute comes into 
force; the date will depend on states' 
eagerness to sign. 
2° For comparison: 
ICTY: crimes committed on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia. 
ICTR: crimes committed on the territory of 
Rwanda and committed by Rwandan 
nationals in neighbouring states. 
21 Alternative formulations could be: 'crimes 
committed against East Timorese by 
Indonesian nationals', or 'against East 
Timorese eligible voters and their children'. A 
limitation to East Timorese or East Timor is 
essential to avoid expanding the tribunal's 
jurisdiction to Aceh, West Papua, the 
Moluccas or other territories, since this 
would probably deter certain members of 
the UN Security Council from approving a 
tribunal. It would be helpful to seek legal 
specialists' advice on the precise language. 
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As long as the Indonesian government has no intention of punishing criminals 
itself under Indonesian law, the international tribunal is necessary to judge those 
who have committed crimes against humanity. And Indonesian domestic law is 
not enough to judge these people, including Indonesian soldiers. 
Bishop Carlos Belo, Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 September 2000 
Observers and the UN inquiry commission were sceptical about Indonesia's 
ability to deliver a fair and impartial prosecution.22 
In fact TNI officers remain sacrosanct. Recently proposed legislation reflects 
this. A bill to establish a human rights court23 falls short of international 
standards and challenges valid UN human rights agreements. Separation of 
powers is compromised; the judiciary is not independent of political 
interference. Responsibilities under the chain of command are explicitly 
excluded. Deadlines for investigation are very short. It appears that 
investigations relating to East Timor are being carried out in accordance with 
these provisions. Indonesia's attorney-general failed to honour the last deadline, 
which expired on 17 October. 
Even if the investigations continue, in the hope of avoiding the 
establishment of an international tribunal, the validity of any indictments 
produced are likely to be challenged by the defendants. Moreover, a 
Constitutional Amendment passed on 18 August 2000 enshrines the principle of 
non-retroactivity for all laws including human rights laws.24 This means that the 
human rights court bill could only apply to crimes committed after it was 
passed, therefore excluding the events in East Timor. 
The suspects' lawyers have already declared that they would use this non-
retroactivity clause to protect their clients, on the principle that constitutional 
provisions hold primacy over other laws. But human rights violations cannot be 
treated as ordinary crimes. 
Although Indonesian attorney-general Marzuki Darusman is widely admired 
overseas, he was deputy chairman of Golkar, the ruling party under Suharto. 
Munir, an outstanding Indonesian lawyer and human rights defender, and a 
member of Indonesia's national investigation commission on East Timor, is 
convinced that the attorney-general is continuing to bow to pressure from the 
military. Munir therefore recently called for an international tribunal on East 
Tim or. 
Establishment of an international tribunal, however, does not relieve 
Indonesia of its responsibilities. An international court will address only the 
most serious cases, while many other serious crimes, including complicity inside 
Indonesia's administration, need to be prosecuted. An international tribunal is 
therefore an indispensable supplement to Indonesian national trials, as Jose 
Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmao have said. 
East Timor 
East Timor will eventually also have obligations to prosecute serious breaches of 
humanitarian law committed on its territory or against its population.25 
East Timor is not yet a sovereign state and as long as it remains under UN 
administration, an international tribunal on the models of the ICTY and the 
ICTR is the only option. As in the case of Indonesia, East Timor's judiciary 
system needs improvement, as it has to deal with many major crimes.26 This is 
an enormous task. The UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) 
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit has reduced the number of cases under 
investigation to four: the mass killings at Liqui<;a, Maliana, and Los Palos, and at 
the house of former governor Manuel Carrascalao.27 Other, equally serious 
incidents, such as the massacres at Suai and Oecussi, are not being investigated.28 
Without a UN Security Council mandate under Chapter VII of the charter, 
similar to those for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a tribunal situated in East Timor 
would remain toothless. As Indonesia has failed to honour the extradition treaty 
struck in April 2000, any prosecutions other than mock trials in absentia seem to 
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22 Training of Indonesian judges and inquiry 
staff is inadequate. Corruption, nepotism 
and political interference are common. 
Decisions about who is charged, convicted 
or acquitted may depend on privileges, 
political advantages and loyalties rather than 
on evidence. The army clings to the 
legitimising myth that it is the parental 
leader of the nation, and acts from a position 
of power detached from common norms of 
social behaviour. It sees itself as a ruler who 
stands above the law, whose actions are not 
bound to moral principles and whose prime 
duty is to guarantee cosmic harmony. The 
latter concept is in practice reduced to 
stability: simple maintenance of the current 
power arrangement. If that is the purpose, 
impunity is natural - even necessary. 
Rendering justice therefore amounts to 
revolution and aims at the very heart of the 
military claim on power. It will therefore be 
met with fierce resistance. 
23 The bill was approved by the House of 
Representatives on 6 November 2000. 
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• The principle of nullum crimen sine lege - no 
crime without a law - does not apply if 
international law has statutes that a state 
chooses to ignore to allow impunity. 
25 Provided it signs up to the UN conventions, 
as the CNRT leadership has indicated it 
would do. 
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• East Timor's judicial structure is still very 
weak and human rights monitors have 
voiced reservations about the rule of law 
.inside its institutions. The UN administration 
in East Timor has opted to validate 
Indonesian legislation, but this sometimes 
contradicts international human rights 
standards. 
21 At least 25 people were killed when pro-
Indonesian militia attacked the church in 
Liqui~a on 6 April 1999. Twelve were killed 
at the Carrascalao house on 17 April. Up to 
47 people died in a militia attack on 8 
September in Maliana. Another militia group 
killed nine people in Los Palos on 25 
September; two of the vitcims were nuns 
returning from delivering food to refugees. 
28 Hundreds of people, mainly women and 
children, were killed at Suai on 6 September 
1999. UNTAET estimates that 75 people 
from the Oecussi enclave were killed on 9 
September, after being abducted from their 
villages; their mass graves were discovered 
by Australian soldiers in December 1999. 
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be most unlikely. Besides, it is doubtful if a national tribunal, whether in 
Indonesia or East Timor, could be sufficiently impartial for fair trials and the 
delivery of justice. 
The international community 
International law requires action. If nothing results from national prosecutions 
and impunity prevails, then - according to the current interpretation of 
international law - there is an explicit obligation on the international 
community to establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal.29 Statutes 
would most likely be modelled on those of the ICTY, the ICTR or the ICC. 
National and international prosecution: Is there a compromise solution? 
National and international prosecutions in such cases as East Timor should, in 
principle, be complementary. However a different model is currently being 
tested in Cambodia: international components30 are being introduced into a 
national tribunal. So far, the outcome is unsatisfactory and offers no real 
alternative to an international tribunal. Indonesia had suggested a 'mixed' 
tribunal similar to Cambodia's after the Atambua attack, when calls for an 
international tribunal became louder. 31 
Establishing an international tribunal 
In the absence of a permanent International Criminal Court, ad hoc tribunals are 
indeed the only option for international criminal prosecution. The existing 
tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR) were established by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.32 Chapter VII requires states to 
cooperate with international tribunals, for instance to conduct investigations -
on site if necessary - prosecutions and extraditions. In the past this has had little 
practical effect. However, war criminals from the former Yugoslavia have been 
captured by international forces. Therefore those wishing to promote an 
international tribunal on East Timor should lobby for a court to be established 
by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The UN inquiry commission was tasked with providing secretary-general Kofi 
Annan 'with its conclusions with a view to enabling him to make 
recommendations on future actions'. Surprisingly, the comm1ss10n 
recommended that the secretary-general establish a court - which his office had 
not expected. Annan published the recommendations without adopting or 
rejecting them, but stated that he felt 'encouraged by the commitment shown 
by [Indonesian] President Abdurrahman Wahid to uphold the law and to fully 
support the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators through the 
national investigation' in Indonesia. Through diplomatic channels, Annan 
signalled that he was observing a three-month moratorium to evaluate 
Indonesian efforts to bring the culprits to justice. This moratorium ended by 
May 2000, but the secretary-general has made no official statement yet. 
While the international community, setting aside the recommendations of 
United Nations Special Rapporteurs and the United Nations Commission of 
Inquiry, has waited for the Indonesian government to try perpetrators, the 
defenceless victims of these mostly pre-meditated actions, are struggling to 
come to terms with huge physical and emotional loss. No healing process can 
start in the knowledge that perpetrators are at large, and will go unpunished. 
Without healing, East Timor's unique chance of founding a nation based on 
higher principles rooted in freedom and equity, will be still-born. Justice is vital 
not only to East Timor's future, but also to the future of Indonesia, which is also 
struggling to found a democratic state based on the rule of law. 
Christian Churches call for justice and peace in East Timar, statement signed 
by Christian organisations and churches internationally, 
3 December 2000 
2
• If national courts are unable or unwilling to 
institute proceedings against suspects (and 
the planners of the crimes, in particular) with 
governmental or military command 
authority. See ILC report 1996 and the 
principles of the Rome Statute. 
30 In the form of prosecutors and judges. 
31 Initially, the states promoting a permanent 
International Criminal Court, the European 
governments in particular, had planned to 
establish the ICC quickly, to enable a solely 
international prosecution of members of the 
Khmer Rouge. This was fiercely resisted by 
the United States, which has opposed the 
ICC and has not signed up to it - probably 
because of its war crimes in Vietnam, and 
many other conflicts. The convenient death 
of Pol Pot just days before a preparatory 
meeting for the Rome conference in June 
1998, defused the discussion. In an attempt 
to reduce US opposition to the treaty, it was 
agreed that the ICC would be able to 
prosecute only those crimes committed after 
it came into existence. The United States 
prefers to sponsor ad hoc tribunals, to reduce 
public pressure to hasten the establishment 
of the ICC. 
32 The ICC statute vests certain powers in the 
Security Council (see §16, delaying veto for 
the Security Council). 
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This year's chairman's statement on East Timor from the UN Commission on 
Human Rights was very weak but, even so, Indonesia has failed to meet its 
requirements. This, together with Indonesia's refusal to honour the extradition 
agreement struck with East Timor, accentuates the need for firm international 
action. 
Political considerations 
The CNRT has recently renewed its demand for international prosecutions, 
urging the UN Security Council to establish an international ad hoc tribunal. 
While the demand gained more support, in the United States in particular, after 
the Atambua attack, the Security Council is not enthusiastic about the request. 
This is not only because individual members fear for their bilateral relations with 
Indonesia. A tribunal is expensive. Russia and China might block it for political 
reasons.33 It seems to be crucial that the lobby for an international tribunal 
clearly limits the scope of prosecution (temporal and territorial jurisdiction) to 
East Timor, as any move beyond that will most probably not be acceptable to the 
Security Council. 
In the New Year Ireland and Norway will become non-permanent members 
of the Security Council, and they are likely to support an ad hoc tribunal. The 
presidency of the European Union will move from France to Sweden - with a 
policy co-ordinator already identified, who is known to take courageous 
positions on human rights and accountability.34 
The next East Timor donors' meeting is due on 5 and 6 December in Brussels, 
and offers an opportunity to lobby the European Union. 
Further information 
The full texts of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, and the Statutes of 
the ICC, ICTY and ICTR can be found in the International Humanitarian Law 
database, on the website of the International Committee of the Red Cross: 
www.icrc.org 
For information about the ICTY, see: 
www.un.org/icty 
For information about the ICTR, see: 
www.ictr.org 
Updates on the progress of ratification of the ICC Statute, and documents from 
the ICC Preparatory Commission, are available on the website of the non-
governmental Coalition for an International Criminal Court: 
www.iccnow.org 
For texts of the UN human rights conventions, see: 
www.untreaty.org 
For articles by journalists, lawyers and scholars about armed conflicts and other 
international issues in the light of international humanitarian law, see the website 
of the Crimes of War project: 
www.crimesofwar.org 
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33 It remains to be seen if China's interest in 
gaining future East Timor's acceptance of the 
One-China policy might outweigh its 
reservations about international criminal 
prosecution. Russia is negotiating arms sales 
to Indonesia. 
"' The permanent representative of the Union's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier 
Solana, the so-called EU Foreign Minister, is 
not given to stressing human rights. At the 
meeting of the Consultative Group on 
Indonesia, on 17-18 October 2000 in Tokyo, 
he did not even insist that Indonesia solve 
the refugee problem in West Timor as a 
precondition for aid. 
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The Christian churches 
Confronting instability 
East Timor is going through an 
important and sensitive phase as it 
prepares for complete independence. 
Manuel Abrantes of the Dili Diocesan 
Justice and Peace Commission discusses 
the mission, priorities and concerns of 
the Catholic Church during the 
transition. 
recognition that for divine 
forgiveness, the ability to 
forgive our neighbours, 
and even our enemies, is 
crucial. 
A country in crisis 
The Christian churches 
East Timor is politically, socially and economically fragile. It is in dire need of housing, jobs, security, law and 
order, and humanitarian assistance. East 
Timorese nationalism is thriving, but 
tensions remain in the process of 
establishing constitutional democracy and 
the rule of law. Twenty-four years of 
occupation have bred a culture of 
violence, intolerance, resentment, hatred 
and revenge. 
'The Church is particularly 
concerned for East Timor's 
political and economic 
stability. The subsistence 
and survival economy 
endured by East Timorese 
during decades of 
Ermera's parish priest on the road with some of his parishioners. 
The Catholic Church is an integral part 
of East Timorese society. Its role has been, 
is and always will be spiritual, pastoral, 
charitable, humanitarian and social, 
working with the communities at the base 
- the parishes, villages and hamlets. A 
living sign of the presence of God is the 
social apostolate, which incorporates the 
tasks of teaching and education, humanity 
and charity, and social justice. The Church 
will continue to promote social justice and 
education. 
A special preoccupation is the concern 
for peace: spreading the culture of non-
violence and ending hostilities and wars. 
Peace is not simply the absence of war, but 
also the establishing of calm in the souls 
of all Timorese. Peace requires mutual 
acceptance of all Timorese and the 
New beginnings 
The East Timorese Protestant Church 
seeks new members and a new role. 
Feije Duim reports. 
I n the course of last year's conflict, the Gereja Kristen Timor Timur (GKTT -Christian Church of East Timar) lost 
many members and staff. Many of these 
were from the Indonesian archipelago, 
and returned to their places of origin or 
went elsewhere as it became clear that East 
Timar would become independent. A 
small minority of members (including 
some pastors) belonged to the pro-
autonomy factions, or even the militias. 
They are now afraid to return. 
Indonesian occupation, followed by the 
destruction of almost all basic 
infrastructure in September 1999, has 
degenerated into crisis. This could provoke 
insurrection and political instability in 
East Timar. 
Those responsible for law and order are 
failing to enforce the law, and it is proving 
difficult to establish a functioning and 
competent judicial system to apply laws 
and regulate social life. This, too, carries a 
threat of anarchy. 
There are constant incursions, 
infiltrations and sporadic attacks on the 
East Timorese border by militias and 
Indonesian soldiers based in West Timar. 
Together with social intolerance and 
radical posturing by some politicians, they 
threaten the peace and stability of East 
Timar and the national unity pact agreed 
at the CNRT national congress in August 
2000. 
Priorities 
Because of the havoc wreaked by the 
The Protestant Church has lost its main 
financial base: the city congregations 
whose members - civil servants, police 
officers, military - had large salaries. Most 
were of Indonesian origin and have now 
gone. The Church must therefore look for 
a financial base in the rural communities. 
It now has about 20,000 members, mainly 
in the villages, down from some 25,000-
30,000 members before the independence 
ballot of August 1999. Most of its 13 
pastors are young. They are led by the Rev 
Francisco Vasconcelos. 
Cooperation 
The pastors want to reorganise the church 
and to take an active role in society, 
promoting justice and reconciliation, as a 
continuation of their efforts during the 
militias last year, a considerable amount of 
church infrastructure must now be rebuilt. 
The Church agrees with the priorities for 
national reconstruction set by the recent 
congress of the National Council of 
Timorese Resistance (CNRT), as well as 
those set by the CNRT /UN transitional 
government. But its immediate conerns 
include evangelisation and the following 






reconciliation for peace achieved in a 
holistic and participatory fashion at 
the grassroots and between all religious 
confessions 
the eradication of poverty in the villages 
sustained economic rehabilitation for 
the rural areas 





• advocacy for human rights and social 
justice. 
Indonesian period. To achieve this, they 
cooperate with East Timorese NGOs and 
human rights groups such as Yayasan Hak, 
FOKUPERS, and Forum Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa. The church also wants to 
develop self-help groups for young people 
who have experienced trauma and lack 
skills. 
YASONA, a community development 
foundation started by the Protestant 
Church, has worked with refugees and 
returnees in the aftermath of the ballot, 
with support from Action of Churches 
Together (ACT) International. It is now 
shifting its focus to community 
development. Much remains to be done 
for returnees and the population of the 
border area (especially in the South) and 
in the Oekussi enclave. 




CllR's Catherine Scott reviews recent 
books about East Timor's struggle for 
independence. 
The East Timor Question: The struggle 
for independence from Indonesia, by 
Paul Hainsworth and Stephen Mccloskey 
(eds), IB Tauris Publishers, London & 
New York, 222 pages, 2000. 
This anthology, compiled by two 
individuals with a strong history of 
support and solidarity for East Timar, has 
a distinct Irish flavour. It is a reminder of 
Ireland's consistent support for the East 
Timorese cause, spurred by a determined 
and committed solidarity campaign on 
both sides of the border. But the editors, 
both from the North of Ireland, also 
address the role of the British government. 
The chapters, contributed by a range of 
academics and activists, provide history, 
analysis and casestudies of successful civil 
solidarity action. Particularly moving is 
Maureen Tolfree's account of the cover-up 
of the killing of five television journalists 
during Indonesia's invasion of East Timar 
in 1975. Tolfree, sister of Brian Peters, one 
of the victims, shows how readily 
government officials brush aside the 
feelings of ordinary families for the sake of 
wider policy and political concerns. 
Paul Hainsworth's assessment of the 
current British government's performance on 
East Timar is timely and finely balanced. He 
concludes that Labour has made a very 
creditable contribution on the diplomatic 
front but, with a legacy of arms contracts of 
the previous government, proved unable to 
reconcile the demands of the British arms 
industry with ethical standards. This is a 
rather generous view. Parliamentary 
investigation by four select committees 
indicates that Labour could perhaps have 
revoked the sale of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia. 
The book's focus throughout is on the 
role of the international community, 
international politics and policy, 
geopolitical change in Indonesia, and 
lessons from other countries such as South 
Africa. In this respect, it assembles a useful 
collection of material which is up to date, 
informative, analytical and digestible. 
Its weakness lies in the scant attention 
paid to the efforts of the East Timorese 
themselves to secure independence, and 
their ultimate success, albeit after terrible 
loss of life. The East Timorese, through 
their courage, determination and tenacity, 
liberated themselves - with a little help 
from their friends. The part played by East 
Timorese women in their liberation 
struggle is entirely missing from the book. 
For a well-balanced record of East Timor's 
history, politics, international relations, 
developmental challenges and needs, this 
is a serious omission. 
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East Timor: The Price of Freedom, by John 
G Taylor, Zed Books, 248pp, 1999 
This is a welcome reprint and update of 
John Taylor's excellent history of East 
Timar, first published in 1990 as Indonesia's 
Forgotten War. The original text remains, 
the chronology has been updated, and a 
new chapter charts developments from the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
In the new chapter, Taylor explains how 
the catastrophe of September 1999 came 
about. He starts with an earlier tragedy, the 
Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, which 
brought two notable changes: greater 
international awareness of the appalling 
repression, and increased violence in East 
Timar as the elite special forces, Kopassus, 
took control of security operations. 
The author covers the subsequent 
turning points. The fall of Indonesia's 
President Suharto in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis opened up some democratic 
space in both Indonesia and East Timar. 
Under his successor, BJ Habibie, new 
political possibilities appeared. 
Here, Taylor puts the fundamental 
question: why did Habibie risk his political 
neck by offering a referendum in East 
Timar? Taylor believes that Habibie was 
attempting to establish his credentials, 
differentiate himself from Suharto and 
improve his electoral prospects on the 
strength of international acclaim. But he 
underestimated the opposition. With 
democratic elections approaching, 
candidates such as Megawati Sukarnoputri 
used East Timar to stir up Indonesian 
nationalism. The army, too had other ideas: 
it prepared a covert operation, Global Clean-
Sweep, as a final solution for East Timar. 
Meanwhile, active and retired armed forces 
commanders systematically undermined 
progress at the diplomatic level. Many had a 
long history of involvement in East Timar, 
dating back to the invasion in 19 7 5, and this 
only served to bolster their determination. 
The militias were their pawns in a cynical 
and violent exercise conducted in defiance 
of the entire world. 
For Taylor, the turning point for 
international policy came when the 
militias overstepped the mark by invading 
the ultimate place of sanctuary, Bishop 
Bela's house, killing 39 people. Thereafter, 
pressure on the US state department 
increased dramatically. The United States, 
backed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, threatened 
economic sanctions. The catastrophic 
implications for the Jakarta elite forced 
Indonesia to accept foreign military 
intervention. Taylor's account moves 
between international developments and 
the brutality on the streets of East Timar, 
showing how they influenced each other. 
The author concludes that Kopassus 
and the generals miscalculated the 
chances of getting away with a repetition 
of their previous behaviour. The degree of 
international concern, translated into real 
action, came as a shock. But it did not 
prevent them from using the East Timor 
issue in the run-up to the October 1999 
presidential elections in Indonesia. East 
Timor, even as an independent nation, 
could remain subject to continuing 
economic and political destabilisation. Its 




Report of the CllR observer 
delegations to the Popular 
Consultation in East Timor, 1999 
One of the few organisations active on East 
Timar since the Indonesian invasion, CUR 
sent a mission to the territory in 1999 to 
monitor the UN-supervised vote on 
independence. This report summarises the 
mission's findings, highlighting the 
inadequate security arrangements. In doing 
so, it pays tribute to the courage and 
determination of ordinary East Timorese 
people to assert their wish for independence, 
despite extreme intimidation. 
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